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THOMAS A. ZIMMERMANN
The Dangerous Rise of Economic 
Interventionism
1. Introduction: Economic crises and interventionism1
1.1. The attractions of economic interventionism
Economically hard times such as the 2007-2009 financial and economic 
crisis tend to place policymakers under stress. In the light of shrinking 
demand and the pains inflicted by structural adjustment on economies 
and their populations, calls for increased protection and government 
intervention abound. Policymakers come under strong pressure to re-
spond positively to such calls, particularly when voiced by well-organised 
interest groups with political power, if they wish to maximise political 
support.
Economic crises therefore almost inevitably lead to an increasing de-
gree of government interventionism in the economy. Its primary goal is 
usually the prevention of rising unemployment.
One key ingredient is classical protectionism through trade and in-
vestment policy measures (such as tariffs or various non-tariff barriers 
to trade), affecting trade in goods, services, and cross-border investment 
flows. Their key purpose is to keep demand and capital at home. 
1 Thomas A. Zimmermann (http://www.zimmermann-thomas.ch) is a research as-
sociate at the Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic 
Research (SIAW-HSG) at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, He serves as head 
of the division «Law, Organisation and Accreditation» and member of the board at 
the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) in Berne, Switzerland. The 
author has prepared this paper exclusively in his personal capacity as a researcher. 
All the views expressed in this paper are exclusively those of the author and shall not 
be attributed to any institution to which the author is affiliated. This version of the 
paper reflects developments until 20 January 2010. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges valuable comments from Heinz Hauser and Christoph A. Schaltegger, as well 
as dedicated editorial assistance from Pamela Gasser-Johnson. The remaining errors 
are solely those of the author.
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Another key element of economic interventionism is fiscal policy 
– through specifically designed stimulus programmes, increased subsidi-
sation, government credits, and emergency actions (including outright 
firm ownership) with a view to supporting firms or bailing out entire 
industries (e.g. banks, car manufacturers). These expansionary fiscal 
policies are meant to complement the effects of automatic stabilisers. 
The latter regularly include unemployment and other social insurances, 
as well as the cycle-smoothing effects of the tax system. The purpose of 
fiscal policy measures is to bridge a temporary dip in demand and to 
prevent otherwise healthy firms from closing and staff layoffs from ris-
ing. With a view to the emergency measures taken in the banking sector, 
their purpose is also to prevent domino effects and the destabilisation of 
the financial sector in the event that large or interconnected institutions 
of systemic importance should fail (e.g. the collapse of the American 
investment bank LEHMAN BROTHERS).
Monetary policies may also be altered in response to crises. The pri-
mary instrument is a reduction of interest rates by central banks. In the 
current crisis, several central banks have taken additional measures, 
commonly summarised as ‘unconventional policies’ or ‘quantitative eas-
ing’, including inter alia purchases of bonds or other securities by the 
central bank. These measures have been taken with a view to increasing 
the money supply and unfreezing credit markets after the possibilities of 
cutting interest rates have been exhausted. Finally, purchases of foreign 
currencies by central banks can be used in order to suppress the value 
of the domestic currency, as a means of increasing the supply of the do-
mestic currency with a view to fighting deflation and, possibly, to giving 
an edge to a country’s exporters. 
At the time of writing (December 2009), we may conclude that eco-
nomic interventionism has served its purpose relatively well: political 
stress, turmoil and instability have been prevented in most countries for 
the time being, as governments have largely remained in power; most 
major economies are currently coming out of the recession or appear, at 
least, to have bottomed out; asset markets have rebounded (in particular 
the stock market) and banks are seemingly on their way towards con-
solidation of their balances; the rise of unemployment has been more 
moderate than had been feared, at least in some countries; resource 
prices are rising again and the risk of the world economy falling into a 
1930s style deflationary spiral also appears to have been banned as of 
now.
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1.2. The dangers of economic interventionism
Despite its attractions and achievements in the short term, economic 
interventionism may nevertheless come at a heavy cost in the longer 
term – a cost which potentially surmounts the benefits of its short-term 
blessings.
On the micro-economic level, protectionist measures distort produc-
tion, consumption and factor allocation, thereby creating economic 
inefficiencies and weighing heavily on wealth creation, prosperity and 
growth perspectives. Increased subsidisation and government involve-
ment in business ownership or the credit industry bear the risk of 
creating or maintaining over-capacities. More generally, political mis-
management and state failure (as opposed to the market failure which 
is often cited as a pretext for interventions) may result from such ac-
tions. State interventions may also lead to moral hazard: For example, 
lax monetary policies in conjunction with bailout perspectives for finan-
cial institutions create strong incentives for excessive risk-taking in the 
financial sector.
On the macro-economic level, interventionism may destabilise an 
economy in the longer run and undermine its sustainability. Expansionary 
fiscal policies such as stimulus programmes, bailouts and emergency 
measures often imply massive deficits and a build-up of excessive debt, 
weighing heavily on future generations. They provoke increased taxation 
during the payback period (further impairing productivity), doubts about 
the government’s solvency and sovereign default risks, the crowding-out 
of private borrowing, and/or increasing long-term interest rates. They 
also imply a risk of future inflation if price stability were to be sacrificed 
for the benefit of a seemingly ‘easy way’ out of debt.
Monetary policy interventions in the form of overly lax policies may 
lead to new asset price bubbles – particularly in cases where credit chan-
nels are clogged and excess liquidity flows into asset markets. This, in 
turn, may result in subsequent crises, making lax monetary policies a 
root cause of a vicious circle of boom-and-bust, and in the exorbitant 
economic and social cost which each bursting bubble entails. Moreover, 
where easy monetary policies are not phased-out in due time, inflation 
may loom. In combination, heavy fiscal and monetary interventions may 
have a profound impact on currencies, possibly leading to international 
monetary disorder and thereby provoking further interventions such as 
capital controls or other protectionist responses.
Beyond its economic costs, interventionism also bears political costs: 
It creates vested interests that will seek to increase their influence on 
policy-making and to cement the state interventions from which they 
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benefit beyond the crisis. The share of directly unproductive, rent-
seeking activities in the economy may therefore increase, reducing 
the headroom for governments to undo the interventions in due time. 
Furthermore, institutional balances may be disturbed, e.g. if Central 
Banks come under pressure not to withdraw unsustainably lax mone-
tary policies to which the economy has become used. If macro-economic 
conditions deteriorate up to the point where a state default and/or high 
inflation lure, the result may be a breakdown of public services and pub-
lic order, undermining democracy and political stability. And on the 
international level, the recourse to measures of nationally oriented eco-
nomic interventionism is a potential source of tensions and conflicts.
Finally, there are also more fundamental, societal and psychologi-
cal costs of economic interventionism. Government interventions of all 
sorts restrict the freedom of transaction of individuals and economic 
freedom more generally, thus undermining a key pillar of any free and 
democratic society. Deficit-spending by states provides a poor role mod-
el for individual economic actors. Similarly, lax monetary policies punish 
savers and reward profligacy, overconsumption, indebtedness, leverage 
and hazardous risk-taking. Where such policies lead to high inflation, 
the negative economic and psychological effects on the economy and so-
ciety at large are exacerbated, in addition to the inherent violation of the 
right to private property which is a key foundation of any free society. 
Moreover, the moral hazard emanating from bailouts through the 
privatisation of profits and the parallel socialisation of losses leads to a 
separation of the risk to lose and the chance to make profits, thus under-
mining the basic sense of responsibility that is needed for the long-term 
success of any economy. It may drive a country’s most productive forces 
and most brilliant brains into activities of questionable value, where 
money can be made easily, possibly at the expense of the public. At the 
same time, it leaves the rest of the economy with a sense of frustration 
and injustice, thus shaking the public support for the market economy 
in a dangerous way.
Another fundamental problem of economic interventionism is that 
an increased share of government in the economy – through both high-
er expenditure and higher taxation – increases the dependence of ever 
growing parts of the population on redistribution activities of the states. 
It thus alienates people further from the productive mechanisms of 
wealth creation.
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1.3. Purpose of the paper 
In summary, economic interventionism may well serve the purpose of 
providing temporary relief to affected economies and to alleviate stress 
on policymakers. However, the manifold costs of economic intervention-
ism may easily surmount its benefits in the medium to long term. It is 
therefore of paramount importance that policymakers exercise restraint 
in taking interventions; that such interventions are carefully chosen with 
a view to minimising their negative side effects; and that such measures 
are quickly withdrawn once the worst of a crisis is over. In light of the 
characteristics of the political market and the institutional inertia, and 
as experience with previous crises shows, there is a real risk that provi-
sional interventions become permanent or that the exit occurs too late. 
If they do so, they keep a hypertrophic economy going with all the eco-
nomic, political and other costs detailed above.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: one objective is to explore 
whether, how, and to which extent policymakers have resorted to poli-
cies of economic interventionism in reaction to the 2007-2009 financial 
and economic crisis. The second objective is to summarise policy op-
tions of an exit from these various interventions and of a return to more 
market-oriented mechanisms in the world economy.
In the absence of a widely-used and clear definition of the term 
‘economic interventionism’ we understand it rather broadly: The under-
lying concept is i.) the preference for supporting a country’s own firms, 
industries, workers, capital owners as well as for keeping jobs, capital, 
economic activity, and tax revenue within the country; and ii.) the de-
sire by political leaders to exercise political control over the economic 
cycle. The implementation of this concept occurs through government 
intervention in the economy at two levels: i.) restrictions of the freedom 
of transaction of individuals by treating international economic transac-
tions less favourably than national transactions (protectionism); and ii.) 
fiscal and monetary policy interventions with a view to controlling the 
business cycle, usually by increasing demand and by re-inflating prices, 
thereby influencing decisions of consumption, production and factor al-
location. Both trajectories of economic interventionism imply increased 
influence of the state over private economic actors and, therefore, a 
shift of power.
In accordance with this approach, we seek to analyse a wide spec-
trum of measures in various sectors. This paper covers trade policy in 
goods and services (chapter 2), investment policies (chapter 3), fiscal 
policies (chapter 4), and monetary policies (chapter 5). In doing so, this 
essay aims at drawing the ‘big picture’. We are aware that the creation 
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of a complete list or a detailed analysis of the measures taken by gov-
ernments around the globe would be beyond the reach of this paper 
– first on account of the sheer number of measures taken, and second 
on account of the dynamism with which developments in this area take 
place. We therefore include several references to recent publications 
and databases in which the individual policy measures are catalogued or 
discussed in more detail2. Chapter 6 offers a summary of the main find-
ings, whereas chapter 7 discusses policy options for an exit from these 
interventions.
2. Trade policies
2.1. Overall assessment: The broken promise to refrain 
from protectionism
International trade has been severely affected by the crisis: As per 
August 2009, global trade was down 18% from its peak in April 2008, 
and down 15% year-on-year. As the world economy has improved in 
the 2nd half of 2009, trade has been increasing since, but flows are still 
far away from their pre-crisis levels3.
In the Declaration issued at their summit on 15 November 2008, the 
G-20 Governments declared: «We underscore the critical importance 
of rejecting protectionism and not turning inward in times of financial 
uncertainty». This and similar pledges have since been reiterated with 
some frequency. At the last G-20 summit in Pittsburgh on 24 and 25 
September 2009, the ‘Leader’s statement’ reads «We will fight protec-
tionism. We are committed to bringing the Doha Round to a successful 
conclusion in 2010», as well as «We will keep markets open and free 
and reaffirm the commitments made in Washington and London: to 
refrain from raising barriers or imposing new barriers to investment 
or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions or 
implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent meas-
2 See the references in the bibliography at the end of this paper, in particular the 
publications by the WTO, the OECD, UNCTAD, the IMF, and Global Trade Alert.
3 For more detailed figures, see WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (WTO) (ed.), Overview 
of Developments in the International Trading Environment, WTO, Document No. WT/
TPR/OV/12, Geneva 18 November 2009. Available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/TPR/OV12-00.doc., Part A, Page A-8ff.
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ures to stimulate exports and commit to rectify such measures as they 
arise»4. Have countries lived up to these reiterated pledges?
The measures taken by countries in the area of trade policy have 
since been monitored, inter alia, by ‘Global Trade Alert’ (GTA) – an 
independent initiative co-ordinated by the Centre for Economic Policy 
Research (CEPR) and managed by SIMON EVENETT at the Swiss Institute 
for International Economics and Applied Economic Research at the 
University of St. Gallen (SIAW-HSG)5. GTA runs a publicly accessible 
database6 and has, since its inception in June 2009, published three 
major reports7. As EVENETT holds in his recent analyses, the G-20 pledg-
es and exhortations to eschew protectionism have been subject to a 
‘serial violation’8, and a ‘protectionist juggernaut’ is under way9.
According to the 3rd GTA Report of December 2009, governments 
around the globe have introduced 297 beggar-thy-neighbour policy 
measures since the G-20 summit of November 2008, i.e. more than 
one measure per working day. Another 56 measures implemented are 
likely to have harmed foreign trade interests, bringing the total to 353 
measures. Regarding all trade policy measures taken since that sum-
mit, the number of protectionist trade measures is nearly six times 
the number of benign or liberalising measures. At the same time, the 
report finds that there are a further 188 state measures announced in 
the pipeline which, if implemented, would likely harm foreign com-
mercial interests10.
A monitoring report by the WTO of July 2009 is less pessimistic, 
but still holds that «the number of new trade-restricting or distorting 
measures announced or implemented since 1 March 2009 exceeds the 
number of new trade-liberalizing or facilitating measures by a factor of 
more than two». According to the same report, «this compares unfa-
vourably with the general situation prevailing over the past few years 
4 See http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm.
5 For more information on Global Trade Alert, please revert to http://www.global-
tradealert.org/about.
6 See http://www.globaltradealert.org.
7 S. EVENETT (ed.), Broken Promises – A G-20 Summit Report by Global Trade Alert [2nd 
GTA report], Global Trade Alert / Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), 
London 2009; S. EVENETT (ed.), Global Trade Alert 1st Report, 8 July 2009, Global Trade 
Alert / Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London 2009; and EVENETT 
(ed.), The Unrelenting Pressure of Protectionism – The 3rd GTA Report – A Focus on the 
Asia-Pacific Region, Global Trade Alert / Centre for Economic Policy Research 
(CEPR), London December 2009.
8 See EVENETT, Broken Promises, p. 3.
9 See EVENETT, Broken Promises, p. 2; EVENETT, The Unrelenting Pressure, p. 3.
10 Ibi, p. 3f.
80 THOMAS A. ZIMMERMANN
when the balance for most WTO members lay firmly on the side of 
trade liberalization»11. The WTO count does not include trade meas-
ures in the context of swine flu (influenza A virus H1N1). A more 
recent report by the WTO of November 200912 confirms that there has 
been ‘policy slippage’ – a term frequently used by the WTO to describe 
the on-going erosion of trade disciplines among its members.
2.2. Protectionist trends in detail
Data available in the Global Trade Alert database per 20 January 
2010 includes 670 policy measures that have been examined by 
the GTA team. Of this total, 457 measures have already been im-
plemented, whereas another 213 measures are still pending. The 
database groups these measures into three categories: The category 
‘red measures’ denotes measures that have been implemented and 
almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests. 
The category ‘amber measures’ encompasses measures which either 
(i) have been implemented and may involve discrimination against 
foreign commercial interests; or (ii) measures which have been an-
nounced or are under consideration and would (if implemented) 
almost certainly involve discrimination against foreign commercial 
interests. The category ‘green measures’ includes measures that have 
been announced and involve liberalisation on a non-discriminatory 
(i.e. most favoured nation) basis; or (ii) measures which have been 
implemented and are found (upon investigation) not to be discrimi-
natory: or (iii) measures which have been implemented, involving no 
further discrimination, and improving the transparency of a jurisdic-
tion’s trade-related policies.
From an analysis of the measures included in the database, we may 
derive the following findings.
2.2.1. Implementing jurisdictions
Most measures emanate in the EU if we add both the measures taken 
on the EU level and the measures taken by all the 27 EU members on 
the national level. 
11 See WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (ed.), Report to the TPRB from the Director-General 
on the Financial and Economic Crisis and Trade-Related Developments, WTO, Document 
No. WT/TPR/OV/W/1, Geneva, 20 April 2009a. Available at http://docsonline. 
wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/TPR/OVW1.doc, p. 2.
12 See WTO, Overview of Developments.
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If, by contrast, we count the measures on a country basis, a differ-
ent picture emerges: In this case, most measures are taken by Russia, 
the United States, India, and Argentina. The first EU member on the 
list is Germany (when adding both the measures taken by the EU and 
the measures taken by Germany on the national level), slightly ahead 
of Brazil, a few other EU countries, and China. Overall, it seems that 
G-20 countries implement a higher share of beggar-thy-neighbour pol-
icies than other countries.
Figure 1 - Jurisdictions implementing most measures
Graph by Thomas A. Zimmermann; Statistical data drawn from the ‘Global 
Trade Alert’ database per 20 January 2010; http://www.globaltradealert.
org. Remarks*); The bar ‘EU 27 + EU countries’ counts both the measures 
taken by the EU on the Union level and the national measures of all EU 
members**); The bar ‘EU 27 (EU level only)’ counts only the measures 
taken by the EU on the Union level***); The bars for the individual EU 
member countries count both the measures taken by the EU on the Union 
level and the national measures taken by the corresponding EU member at 
the national level.
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2.2.2. Jurisdictions affected
China is the most frequent target of the protectionist measures taken, 
followed by Germany, the U.S., France, Italy and Japan. It is noteworthy 
that countries such as Russia or Argentina, that are themselves very ac-
tive in taking protectionist measures, appear further behind on the list 
of jurisdictions affected.
Figure 2 - Jurisdictions most affected by measures
Graph by Thomas A. Zimmermann; Statistical data from the ‘Global Trade 
Alert’ database per 20 January 2010; http://www.globaltradealert.org 
2.2.3. Trade policy measures used
The most frequently used types of measures are trade defence meas-
ures (i.e. antidumping, countervailing duties, safeguards), followed by 
bailouts and state aids (mainly in OECD countries; these are discussed 
in Chapter 4 of this paper), as well as tariff increases. Also high on the 
list, though with a much lower frequency, are measures in public pro-
curement (such as ‘buy national’ rules), investment measures, non-tariff 
barriers, export taxes and restrictions, export subsidies, local content 
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rules, services sector measures, as well as sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures (Graph 3).
Figure 3 - Measures used most frequently
Graph by Thomas A. Zimmermann; Statistical data from the ‘Global Trade 
Alert’ database per 20 January 2010; http://www.globaltradealert.org
In detail, the different types of trade policy measures have been used 
as follows: 
Anti-dumping actions: After having declined between 2001 and 
2007, the number of anti-dumping actions has recently increased. 
Between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 2009, the number of new anti-
dumping initiations reported to the WTO by Members increased by 
15% in relation to the preceding 12 month period. Comparing anti-
dumping actions in the first six months of 2009 with anti-dumping 
actions in the first six months of 2008, one finds that the landscape 
of countries applying such actions has strongly changed. Whereas the 
number of anti-dumping actions in the EC and in the U.S. was down 
from 15 to 2 and from 14 to 10 respectively, the number of actions by 
China and Argentina was up from 3 to 14 and from 14 to 19 respec-
tively. This reinforces the impression that developing countries are 
increasingly having recourse to this trade defence instrument, often 
targeting exports of other developing countries. The product catego-
ries targeted most often are metals, chemicals, and plastics. Analysts 
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expect a strong increase in the number of anti-dumping actions in 
the coming quarters as the investigations react with a certain time-
lag to a deterioration of the economic situation, given the need to 
run through time-consuming procedures. Based on an econometric 
model, analysts expect a strong increase of anti-dumping initiations 
in coming months13.
Countervailing Duty (CVD) Measures: The WTO reports a signifi-
cant increase of countervailing duty investigations. It notes that most 
recent CVD investigations have been initiated simultaneously with 
anti-dumping investigations. Based on trends and figures in the first 
three quarters of 2009, the total number of CVD investigations in 
2009 could surpass the 1999 record of 41 investigations. As in the 
case of anti-dumping investigations, CVD investigations focus pri-
marily on metals, chemicals and plastics. Unlike anti-dumping, CVD 
action is mainly used by developed countries14.
Safeguards: The number of safeguard investigations has also risen 
strongly since the 4th quarter of 2008. Up to the end of October 2009, 
the WTO recorded 26 safeguard investigations, i.e. the second high-
est number since 2002. Most investigations focussed on chemicals, 
cement/glass/ceramics, animal products, and metals. India was one 
of the most frequent users15.
Tariff and NTB increases: Tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
have increased on a wide range of imports, especially on agricultural 
products, iron and steel, motor vehicles and parts, chemical and plas-
tic products, and textiles and clothing16.
Reintroduction of agricultural subsidies: Among the measures we 
find the re-introduction of agricultural subsidies in the European 
Union and the United States (dairy) and a recent increase of such 
subsidies (price adjustment mechanism) in Switzerland17.
‘Sand in the gears’: stricter application of SPS and TBT regulations 
in some G-20 markets, slower procedures and additional procedural 
requirements in the administration of existing trade measures18.
13 See WTO, Overview of Developments, p. A-28f. On the econometric model, see 
WTO, Report to the TPRD, pp. 20ff.
14 For details, see WTO, Overview of Developments, p. A-29, and the GTA database.
15 Ibi, p. A-29f., and the GTA database.
16 Ibi, pp. A-23ff., and the GTA database.
17 See BUNDESAMT FÜR LANDWIRTSCHAFT, Bundesrat unterstützt Massnahmen der 
Landwirtschaft zur Stabilisierung der Märkte, Press release, 2009.
18 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
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2.2.4. Sectors affected
As becomes apparent from an analysis of the individual measures, 
the sectors that benefit the most from protectionist interventions are 
declining industrial sectors and agriculture: basic metals and basic 
chemicals – two sectors characterised by substantial overcapacities – 
are the two sectors most heavily affected by protectionist measures. 
Moreover, special purpose machinery, transport equipment, fabricat-
ed metal products, food products, other chemical products, glass and 
textiles are also concerned. Among services sectors, financial services 
are the single sector most affected by government measures. Nearly 
all measures in this sector are estimated to be protectionist in nature 
and have therefore been grouped by GTA into the ‘red’ category (see 
Graph 4 for details).
The financial services sector is of paramount importance since it 
also has a strong link to investment policy, and to capital markets and 
capital movements in general. It is also affected by the current trend 
towards a re-regulation and by the tax spats that have emerged in 2008 
and 2009 (see Chapter 3 and Section 4.4 of this paper for more de-
tails).
There are several reasons why financial services have been particu-
larly hit by the recourse to economic interventionism. First, financial 
services and portfolio investments often enjoy a lower degree of 
protection against arbitrary state interventions under international 
agreements. Second, rescue packages and bailout actions for financial 
institutions may lead to a partial or total nationalization of the insti-
tutions concerned, potentially leading to issues under international 
agreements and/or conflicts with international investors which could 
give rise to the perception that foreign investors are treated less fa-
vourably than domestic investors, if only for a lack of political clout in 
the host country. And third, financial sector regulation may have an 
adverse impact on foreign investors. By consequence, international 
investment agreements sometimes include ‘prudential carve-out pro-
visions’, establishing that nothing in the agreement shall prevent the 
right of the contracting parties to adopt or maintain prudential meas-
ures19.
(UNCTAD) (eds.), Report on G20 Trade and Investment Measures, OECD, Paris, 2009. 
Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/48/ 43689944.pdf, p. 11.
19 See also UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD) (ed.), 
World Investment Report – Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and 
Development, UNCTAD, New York - Geneva 2009. Available at http://www.unctad.
org/en/docs/wir2009_en.pdf, p. 36.
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Figure 4 - Sectors most affected by measures
Graph by Thomas A. Zimmermann; Statistical data from the ‘Global Trade 
Alert’ database per 20 January 2009; http://www.globaltradealert.org
2.3. Trade negotiations with little progress
Besides the many trade policy measures that make life harder for pri-
vate economic actors in international trade, other aspects reinforce 
the impression that trade liberalisation is currently not high on the 
agenda of policymakers.
On the multilateral level, the low momentum in trade negotiations 
under the Doha Round can be mentioned as an example. There is 
no indication that the Round will be concluded any time soon. In 
summer 2008, hopes for some compromise at an informal ministe-
rial conference were deceived. Expectations are by now very low 
(and are being kept very low by negotiators and by the WTO itself). 
The WTO Ministerial Conference that took place in November/
December 2009 in Geneva did not even have the purpose of advanc-
ing the negotiations – despite the slow progress and the fact that this 
was the first official WTO Ministerial Conference since ‘Hong Kong’ 
in 2005. Besides two minor practical results – extensions of a morato-
rium regarding tariffs on e-commerce and of a moratorium on TRIPS 
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non-violation complaints – the ministers merely agreed to engage in 
a stocktaking exercise in spring 2010 and to hold their next regular 
Ministerial Conference in late 2011.
Another indicator of the low priority accorded to trade issues is 
the current U.S. trade policy under the Obama administration. After 
nearly one year in office, the Administration appears to focus most 
of its attention on domestic policy issues, such as health care reform. 
Despite lukewarm rhetoric to the contrary, the administration has not 
yet come forward with a clear trade strategy – neither for the three 
pending FTAs negotiated by the Bush Administration which still await 
Congressional approval (Korea, Panama, Colombia), nor for the mul-
tilateral Doha Round20.
2.4. Some green sprouts: instances of trade liberalisation
On the positive side, a few countries have also made moves towards 
more liberalisation. For instance, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, 
Mexico, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia announced cuts 
in import duties, fees and surcharges and the removal of non-tariff 
barriers on various products (with some of these countries, however, 
raising trade restrictions – mostly import tariffs – as well). Similarly, 
a few countries (e.g. Australia) have terminated anti-dumping meas-
ures, anti-dumping investigations, and countervailing investigations. 
In services, a positive trend is the generally ongoing liberalisation of 
ICT (Information and Communications Technology) industries. Yet, 
as noted both by EVENETT and the WTO (see above), the overall num-
ber of more restrictive measures is (much) larger than the number of 
liberalising measures.
Another positive (or ambiguous, as critics might argue) point is 
the continued negotiation of free-trade agreements (FTAs) by many 
countries other than the U.S.21. Although these preferential trade 
20 For recent criticism of the current administration in this respect, see for instance 
the articles published in the following editions of the Washington Trade Daily 
(WTD): 4 December 2009, ‘Trade and Foreign Policy’; 3 December 2009, ‘Where’s the 
Trade Agenda?’ and ‘Trade and Jobs – And the Summit; 2 December 2009: First Report 
in the ‘Around the Globe’ section.
21 Recent examples include Swiss FTAs with Albania (signed on 17 December 2009), 
Serbia (signed on 17 December 2009) and with the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC; signed on 22 June 2009); the EU-Korea FTA (initialed on 15 October 2009); 
the India-Korea Comprehensive Partnership Agreement (CEPA; signed in August 
2009); the India-ASEAN FTA (signed in August 2009), the ASEAN-Australia-New 
Zealand FTA (signed in February 2009); the Canada-Colombia FTA (signed on 
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pacts will barely move the multilateral trading system forward, they 
provide instances of trade liberalisation and additional security 
for traders in an environment that is characterised by a more pro-
tectionist climate. Obviously, critics of FTAs might argue that the 
trade-distorting effects of FTAs may be larger than their trade-creat-
ing effects, and that FTAs increasingly lead to a fragmentation of the 
world trading system, doing more harm than good. A detailed discus-
sion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper22.
3. Investment policies23
3.1. Overall assessment: Liberalisation dominates, 
but loses momentum
International investment activity has been strongly affected by the 
financial and economic crisis. According to figures released by 
UNCTAD in January 2010, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows 
have fallen sharply from their record high close to 2.0 trn USD in 
2007 to little over 1.0 trn USD in 2009. Contrary to 2008, when FDI 
inflows to developed countries fell and inflows to developing and 
transition economies still increased, all world regions suffered from 
21 November 2008). Agreements that entered into force in the second half of 
2009 are the FTAs between Japan and Vietnam (1 October 2009), the EC and 
Cameroon (1 October 2009), Japan and Switzerland (1 September 2009), Peru 
and Singapore (1 August 2009), Canada and Peru (1 October 2009), and Canada 
– EFTA (1 July 2009). This footnote is based on information available at the fol-
lowing sources: website http://www.bilaterals.org, WTO (http://rtais.wto.org/
UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx), and SECO (http://www.seco.admin.ch/
themen/00513/00515/01330/index.html?lang=de).
22 See H. HAUSER - T.A. ZIMMERMANN, Regionalismus oder Multilateralismus? «Die 
Volkswirtschaft» 74 (2001), 5, pp. 4-8. Available at http://www.zimmermann-
thomas.de/publikationen/vw0105d4.pdf, for an introduction to this debate and 
further references.
23 Unless otherwise specified, the factual information presented in this chap-
ter is based mainly on UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 
(UNCTAD) (ed.), World Investment Report – Transnational Corporations, Agricultural 
Production and Development, UNCTAD, New York-Geneva 2009. Available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2009_en.pdf, as well as OECD, UNCTAD 
and WTO, Report on G20.
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the decline in 2009. UNCTAD expects a slow recovery in 2010, and a 
subsequent acceleration in 201124.
Contrary to the trend in trade policies, investment policies contin-
ued to be characterised by a dominant trend towards liberalisation. 
According to the UNCTAD database on national laws and regulations, 
the measures that are more favourable to FDI clearly outnumber the 
measures that are less favourable to FDI (see Figure 5). Nevertheless, 
the share of regulatory changes that are less favourable to FDI has 
risen from 2% in the year 2000 to 20% and above since 2005 (see 
Figure 6). 
Figure 5 - National Regulatory Changes, 1992-2008
Graph by Thomas A. Zimmermann; Data source: UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report 2009, pp. 31.
24 See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009, pp. xxvii, xix and 3, and UNITED 
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD) (ed.), Global and 
Regional FDI Trends in 2009 «Global Investment Trends Monitor», 2, UNCTAD, Geneva 
19 January 2010. Available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Download.asp? 
docid=12609&lang=1&intItemID=2068ed.
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Figure 6 - Share of less favourable regulatory changes in percent of all 
regulatory changes, 1992-2008
Graph by Thomas A. Zimmermann; Data source: UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report 2009, pp. 31.
Judged by the numbers, the highest rate of more favourable regulatory 
changes to FDI in 2008 (as a percentage of all regulatory changes in 
the respective region) was recorded for developed countries, with 91%. 
The lowest rate of favourable regulatory changes was recorded in Latin 
America (55%), where some countries took further steps to national-
ize strategic industries – extractive industries in particular. The trend 
towards more state interventions and more restrictive policies towards 
FDI has been noted for several years already and could be considered a 
reflection of the increase in the number of left-leaning governments in 
Latin America that are sceptical of foreign investors.
According to the rather cautious wording in UNCTAD (2009, p. 30), 
«[...] so far, the current financial and economic crisis has had no major 
impact on FDI policies per se». The same report even goes on to say 
that the economic stimulus packages, including public investment pro-
grammes, may have a positive impact on FDI, provided that they are 
administered in a non-discriminatory manner and open to participation 
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by foreign investors. Yet, the report also notes that «some countries have 
begun to discriminate against foreign investors and/or products in a 
‘hidden’ way using gaps in international regulations». Examples of such 
‘covert’ protectionism include favouring products with high domestic 
content in public infrastructure projects, preventing banks from lend-
ing for foreign operations, invoking ‘national security’ exceptions, or 
moving protectionist barriers to the sub-national levels.
3.2. Protectionist trends in investment policies
Among the recent policy trends with a potentially protectionist impact, 
we note25:
The denunciation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs): Ecuador has 
denounced nine BITs. In addition, a BIT between El Salvador and 
Nicaragua, and another BIT between the Netherlands and Venezuela 
have been denounced, too. These denunciations may reflect a new re-
luctance towards BITs, particularly in Latin America.
Nationalisations: Several nationalizations have taken place in Latin 
America, particularly in the extractive industries, the telecommuni-
cations industry, and the oil and gas industry in Bolivia; the cement 
industry in Venezuela; the pension system in Argentina.
Increased scrutiny of FDI for national security reasons: Among these 
measures is the authorisation of the Committee on Foreign Investments 
in the United States (CFIUS) to review transactions that could result 
in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person. This went along with 
an increase in the number of cases reviewed in the U.S. Similarly, an 
amendment to the German Foreign Trade and Payments Act grants the 
Federal Ministry of the Economy and Technology the right to initiate 
a review of foreign investments and to exceptionally prohibit transac-
tions that threaten to impair public security or public order. In Canada, 
the Investment Canada Act authorises the government to review invest-
ments that impair or threaten to impair national security. A noteworthy 
development in France is the establishment of a new public fund which 
will be run by the French Government and the Caisse des Dépôts et 
Consignations (CDC) and which could shield national firms from for-
eign takeovers.
Adverse tax developments: Taxes have risen, for instance in the mining 
industry (e.g. in Zambia), or in Ecuador, which taxes windfall profits on 
oil up to 99%.
25 For details on these and other measures, see UNCTAD, World Investment report 
2009, as well as OECD, UNCTAD and WTO, Report on G20.
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New restrictions for foreign investors: Some countries have introduced 
new bans on foreign investors – e.g. an Indonesian ban on foreign 
investment in the construction and ownership of wireless communica-
tions towers.
Other measures: These include, for instance, discrimination against 
foreign investors in stimulus / bailout packages, or the prevention of 
bank lending for foreign operations. Among other measures, we also 
note competition regulation (e.g. a reservation of intermediation in the 
supply of liquid fuels between the state-owned Venezuelan oil company 
PDVSA and the state); Ecuador’s withdrawal from the Convention of 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); 
or the expansion of the definition of ‘strategic industries’ in Russia to 
42 industries.
3.3. Instances of liberalisation in investment policies
As noted above in the general introduction, and despite the protectionist 
measures described in section 3.2 above, the share of measures facilitat-
ing investments still dominates. The following trends are noteworthy:
Conclusion of new agreements facilitating international investment: Since 
the beginning of the crisis, countries have continued to conclude new 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs), 
and other international investment agreements (including Free-Trade 
Agreements with investment provisions).
A softer stance towards Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs): Sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs) had come under close scrutiny in recent years and were 
increasingly threatened with protectionist measures. OECD countries 
have, however, recently recognised the benefits unfolding from SWF ac-
tivities more explicitly, and protectionist pressures in this respect have 
somewhat decreased. At the same time, SWFs have increased their ef-
forts towards transparency (see Box 1 with details on this issue).
Various other measures aiming at liberalisation: These include: raised or 
abolished FDI ceilings or foreign equity limits (e.g. India, Malaysia); eased 
or streamlined licensing and review processes (e.g. China, Australia); 
eased requirements for the purchase of real estate by foreigners or easier 
access to land (e.g. Australia, Korea, Mexico); tax reductions and sim-
plifications (e.g. Kuwait, Georgia, Switzerland, Japan); liberalisations of 
the exchange rate regime and external financing conditions (e.g. Syria); 
privatizations (e.g. utilities in Kenya, an airline in Kuwait, a petroleum 
company in Jordan, large privatizations in Turkey); improvements of the 
competition regulation (e.g. Mauritius); lifted monopolies (e.g. fix line 
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monopolies in Oman and Qatar); relaxation of visa requirements (Saudi 
Arabia); facilitation in investment in Indian depository receipts.
BOX 1 - SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (SWFS)
In the last few years, protectionist sentiment in the area of international investment 
had risen in particular in the context of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). Their 
activities increased massively in the boom years between 2005 and 2008, 
attracting widespread criticism and arousing suspicion in developed countries. A 
perceived lack of transparency of SWFs, the fact that many SWFs are domiciled 
in countries that are considered authoritarian, and a fear that SWFs might pursue 
political instead of economic goals and thus threaten the national security of host 
countries, were among the main reasons for this criticism. The scepticism towards 
SWFs became particularly virulent during the boom years of 2007 and early 2008.
Since the unfolding of the financial crisis, the criticism about SWFs has somewhat 
muted: As SWFs had massively invested in the financial industry, their capital 
participation was increasingly considered a welcome contribution to the stabilization 
of financial markets when conditions deteriorated. At the same time, the value of 
SWF portfolios decreased due to lower stock market valuations – in particular as 
many SWFs had previously focused their investments on the hard-hit financial 
sector of developed countries. Furthermore, the funds available for international 
investments diminished, since their main capital sources – high resource prices and 
export surpluses – dried up and SWF investments were increasingly directed to their 
home markets.
A further reason for the moderation in the criticism of SWFs, however, was the 
policy reaction on the side of home countries and host countries. SWFs increasingly 
worried about the dismissive response towards their activities in developed 
countries. On 1 May 2008, an International Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds was established. This initiative, which was backed by key SWFs and 
facilitated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), agreed on ‘Generally Accepted 
Principles and Practices’ (GAPP), the so-called ‘Santiago principles’ on 11 October 
2008. The GAPP are based on four guidelines: (i) to help maintain a stable global 
financial system and free flow of capital and investment; (ii) to comply with all 
applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements in the countries in which they 
invest; (iii) to invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and return-related 
considerations; and (iv) to have in place a transparent and sound governance 
structure that provides for adequate operational controls, risk management, and 
accountability. In its ‘Kuwait Declaration’ of 6 April 200926, the IWG established 
the ‘International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds’ (IFSWF) whose purpose it is 
to exchange views on issues of common interest and facilitate an understanding 
of the GAPP. In its ‘Baku Declaration’ of 9 October 2009, the IFSWF reaffirmed its 
commitment, inter alia, to «encourage recipient countries to continue making their 
investment regimes more transparent and non-discriminatory, avoid protectionism, 
26 See http://www.iwg-swf.org/mis/kuwaitdec.htm.
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and foster a constructive and mutually beneficial investment environment».
On the side of the host countries, OECD Ministers adopted, on 5 June 2008, a 
declaration in which they held that «[...] recipient countries should not erect 
protectionist barriers to foreign investment» and that they «should not discriminate 
among investors in like circumstances». According to the declaration, «[...] any 
additional investment restrictions in recipient countries should only be considered 
when policies of general application to both foreign and domestic investors are 
inadequate to address legitimate national security concerns. Where such national 
security concerns do arise, investment safeguards by recipient countries should be 
transparent and predictable, proportional to clearly-identified national security risks, 
and subject to accountability in their application»27. This declaration draws upon 
the recognition that SWFs bring benefits to both home and host countries, and that 
national security concerns – though legitimate – should not be a cover for protectionist 
policies, as recognised in a previously issued report by the OECD of April 200828.
Finally, on 16 July 2009, G-20 members who are also members of the 
OECD, agreed, using standstill procedures established under the legally 
binding OECD Codes of Liberalisation29, to lock in recent measures that 
liberalise inward and outward foreign investment.
Overall, UNCTAD (2009, p. 36) holds that «recent policy developments 
paint a comforting picture». Nevertheless, there are fears that economic 
stimulus programs could give rise to ‘covert protectionism’ by discrimi-
nating against foreign investors, and that a spreading of the crisis to 
so-far unaffected sectors could increase protectionist pressures. Moreover, 
UNCTAD fears that the withdrawal of the State from bailed-out* flagship 
industries could spur economic nationalism if foreign investors were to 
purchase firms that are considered ‘national champions’.
27 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) (ed.), 
OECD Declaration on Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country Policies, adopted 
by Ministers of OECD countries at the Council at Ministerial level, 5 June 2008, 
Document C/MIN(2008)8/FINAL. Available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/ 
olis/2008doc.nsf/LinkTo/NT000032DE/$FILE/JT03247225.PDF.
28 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) (ed.), 
Freedom of Investment, National Security and ‘Strategic’ Industries – Sovereign Wealth Funds 
and Recipient Country Policies – Report by the OECD Investment Committee, OECD, 
Paris, 9 April 2008, Document DAF/INV(2008)5/REV1). Available at http://www.
olis.oecd.org/olis/2008doc.nsf/ENGDATCORPLOOK/ NT00000EE6/$FILE/
JT03243871.PDF. See p. 4 (Box 1) and p. 8 (References) for more details on the 
OECD Acquis in the area of international investment.
29 OECD – Modifications of OECD Countries’ Positions under the Codes of 
Liberalisation of Capital Movements and of Current Invisible Operations and the 
National Treatment Instrument, 16 July 2009.
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4. Fiscal policies
4.1. Overview: Fiscal policy as a major area of economic 
interventionism
During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, fiscal policies have provided gov-
ernments with important instruments for economic interventionism. 
The two most important ones are stimulus programs with a view to 
propping up demand in an otherwise sluggish economy, and treasury-
sponsored emergency schemes for ailing banks and other industries 
(e.g. the car industry).
Such policies can lead to dual distortions: On the one hand, channel-
ling government funds into specific sectors alters the pattern of supply 
and demand as well as capital allocation that would otherwise prevail. 
On the other hand, government expenditures or government-spon-
sored bailout measures may come along with protectionist conditions 
or pressures. Examples include ‘lend local’ requirements for bailed-out 
banks, ‘buy national’ provisions in public procurement, or pressures to 
maintain a certain level of national production in assistance schemes for 
the car industry.
4.2. Stimulus programs
Countries have used a variety of stimulus measures to prop up demand 
in the current crisis. These measures have been taken both on the rev-
enue side (through tax cuts) and, to a larger degree, on the expenditure 
side by increased public spending.
Regarding increased expenditure, the most frequently used instru-
ments have been the provision of safety nets, infrastructure investment, 
as well as housing and construction support. Stimulus measures have 
also included targeted aid to small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), strategic industries, and farmers.
On the revenue side, governments have eased the tax burden for 
both corporate and personal income taxes. Whereas most of the meas-
ures on the expenditure side have been crafted to be temporary, it is 
interesting to note that several stimulus measures on the government’s 
revenue side have a permanent character, particularly as far as corporate 
income tax measures are concerned. These measures will continue to 
weigh on government budgets even once the crisis is over (see figure 7 
for details).
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Figure 7 - G-20 Stimulus Measures, 2008-2010 
Source: IMF (2009b), p. 17.
Figure 8 - G-20: Countries: Estimated Cost of Discretionary Measures taken 
between 2008 and 2010; in % of GDP, relative to 2007 baseline)
Graph: Thomas A. Zimmermann; data source: International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) ed. (2009): Fiscal Implications of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis; 
IMF Staff position note SPN/09/13, 9 June 2009, Table 3.4, p. 15.
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The volume of the stimulus measures is quite substantial. The cumula-
tive size of the support measures taken in 2008, 2009 and 2010 amounts 
to roughly 3.7% of GDP in the year 2007 on average for the G-20 coun-
tries, ranging from 0.3% in the case of Italy up to 9.2% in the case of Saudi 
Arabia. The average yearly size of the stimulus measures in G-20 countries 
was 0.6% of GDP in 2008, 1.9% in 2009, and 1.2% in 2010, according to 
numbers published by the IMF in June 2009 (see Figure 8).
4.3. Emergency actions: Support to the Financial Sector
Another domain of fiscal policy – with an even much larger impact on pub-
lic finances than that of the stimulus programs – is the support provided by 
governments to the financial sector with a view to preventing a breakdown 
of the financial system. 
The key objectives of these measures were i.) to contain and reverse the 
stress in financial markets; ii.) to cleanse banks’ balance sheets of impaired 
assets, and iii.) to recapitalize* and restructure viable but undercapitalised 
financial institutions, and resolve non-viable ones. Among the major forms 
of support that have been granted to the financial sector, we note guaran-
tees, liquidity provision and other support by central banks, central bank 
support provided with treasury backing, asset purchases and lending by the 
treasury, and capital injections. These measures differ widely with regard 
to characteristics such as the degree of distortions to markets, the market 
impact of their unwinding, the contingency for fiscal costs, and whether 
additional transactions are required for their unwinding – to name only a 
few30. Whereas this Chapter focuses on fiscal aspects of this support, the 
emergency measures are closely related to the monetary policy interven-
tions discussed in the next chapter.
Figure 9 shows the total amount of government support to the banking 
system in percent of 2008 GDP (see columns, left axis) and the required up-
front government financing in % of 2008 GDP (see dots, right axis). Figure 
9 makes it clear that countries have been affected by the financial crisis to 
differing extents, and that they have chosen different instruments (in par-
ticular with regard to the upfront financing needs) to tackle the problems. 
Ireland, for instance, has provided total support to its banking industry in 
the amount of 266.4% of 2008 GDP; however, since most of this support 
30 For a more detailed account and discussion of market interventions during the fi-
nancial crisis, as well as references to recent studies in this respect, see INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND (IMF) (ed.), Global Financial Stability Report – Navigating the Financial 
Challenges Ahead, IMF, Washington, D.C., October 2009. Available at http://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/02/pdf/text.pdf, Chapter 3.
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has taken the form of guarantees (261% of GDP), the upfront financing 
needs amount to ‘only’ 5.4% of GDP. In this respect, the situation in Ireland 
differs from the situation in the UK, the country providing the second high-
est headline support in terms of 2008 GDP (81.6%). Although total support 
is much lower in the U.K. than in Ireland, upfront financing needs in the 
UK are much higher, at 18.9% of 2008 GDP, due to a more intense use of 
measures in the categories ‘asset purchases and lending by the treasury’ 
and ‘central bank support provided with treasury backing’. As Figure 9 also 
makes clear, advanced economies had to support their financial sectors to a 
much higher extent than developing and emerging economies.
Figure 9 - Headline Support for the Financial Sector and Upfront Financing 
Needs (as of 19 May 2009; in % of GDP)
Graph: Thomas A. Zimmermann; data source: International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) ed. (2009): Fiscal Implications of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis; 
IMF Staff position note SPN/09/13, 9 June 2009, Table 2.1, pp. 7f.
4.4. Protectionist effects of fiscal policy measures
According to a joint report of the OECD, WTO and UNCTAD (2009), elev-
en G-20 countries31 and the European Union took emergency measures with 
31 Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the 
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.
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a potential of restricting or distorting worldwide capital movements. The 
public expenditure commitments related to these programmes amount to 
3 trillion USD. As the report notes, «the sheer size of these measures and 
their potential effects on competitive conditions (e.g. on firm entry and 
exit) in globalised sectors such as finance and automobiles create a strong 
presumption that they influence worldwide capital flows. Moreover, akin 
to subsidies, emergency measures may effectively create advantages for do-
mestic sectors and put foreign players at a disadvantage».
More generally, the government support scheme may be a source 
of widespread protectionist elements: whereas some crisis protection 
schemes are de iure open to foreign-controlled companies (e.g. car scrap-
ping schemes applying for domestically produced and imported cars alike), 
others are not. Often, it is also quite difficult to draw the line. Discussions 
have arisen, for instance, with regard to the French rescue package for 
RENAULT (where the French government allegedly make the subsidies de-
pendent upon production being maintained in France) or in the German 
government’s preference for a sale of OPEL (a subsidiary of U.S. controlled 
GENERAL MOTORS) to a consortium that would have allegedly maintained 
jobs in Germany rather than other Opel production sites.
With regard to support schemes for financial institutions as well, some in-
stances of protectionist behaviour have become manifest. The government 
programmes in favour of banks have often brought obligations to increase 
lending to domestic businesses, according to a report by the INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF FINANCE (2009) which is quoted in a study by the WTO (2009a): 
According to the IIF, the UK Government has required banks receiving 
public assistance to agree to domestic lending growth targets. French banks 
that tap government assistance have allegedly pledged to increase domes-
tic lending by 3-4 per cent annually, while ING, a Dutch bank, which has 
received government assistance, has reportedly promised to extend € 25 
billion in loans to Dutch businesses and consumers. According to the same 
source, Austria requires assisted banks to strive to make available 200 per 
cent of (government) participation capital to provide credit to Austrian 
businesses. Similar requirements are apparently in place in Greece. In ad-
dition, while there is no explicit requirement, the US government appears 
to have asked TARP32- assisted banks to report regularly on the growth of 
domestic lending.
Beyond the protectionist potential of discretionary spending, cer-
tain beggar-thy-neighbour behaviour can also be noted on the revenue 
side of fiscal policy, i.e. in tax policies. A noteworthy feature is the 
32 The TARP, or Troubled-Asset Relief Programme, is a programme of the U.S. govern-
ment to purchase troubled assets (e.g. securities based on residential or commercial 
mortgages) from financial institutions with a view to strengthening its financial sector.
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success of the G-20 countries in establishing an international tax cartel 
with the active support of the OECD. It has become manifest in actions 
against so-called ‘tax havens’ (mainly through threats of blacklisting 
such countries) with a view to hollowing out bank customer secrecy on 
the international level through forced acceptance of the OECD stand-
ard on information exchange in double taxation treaties. Whereas the 
stated goal of these efforts is to secure tax compliance and tax revenue, 
one may reasonably assume that a more hidden, protectionist agenda 
is also at play: the support of G-20 governments for their own financial 
places (e.g. London) in the highly competitive quest for internationally 
mobile capital.
Discussions about the use of stolen bank customer data by fis-
cal authorities, and its international political repercussions, are 
another indicator of the heated climate regarding tax issues. The 
same holds for Italian raids on Swiss bank branches in Italy and the 
rhetoric of Italian Finance Minister TREMONTI against foreign bank 
deposits, and against the financial centre of Lugano (Switzerland) 
more specifically. Other tax initiatives around the globe (e.g. the 
‘Steuerhinterziehungsbekämpfungsgesetz’ in Germany, or the ‘Levin 
Bill’ in the U.S.) seek to fight tax evasion, often with a protectionist 
element. Taken together, all these initiatives send a strong signal about 
the increasingly squalid character of large countries’ international tax 
policies – with potentially regrettable consequences for the protection 
of economic privacy rights (and perhaps even for property rights in 
the longer run).
Other currently discussed tax projects do not have a protectionist 
bias, at least not prima facie. But constitute nevertheless heavy interven-
tions, e.g. the ‘bonus tax’ discussed in the U.K. and France or the bank 
tax proposed by the OBAMA Administration in January 2010. 
5. Monetary policies: different forms of policy reaction
Monetary policy has been another key area of reaction to the current 
financial and economic crisis. Central banks have made use of a wide 
array of policies. The most important instruments include interest 
rate cuts, so-called ‘unconventional measures’ or ‘quantitative easing’ 
(including various support measures), and interventions on foreign ex-
change markets.
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Along with fiscal policy, monetary policy has arguably been the most 
important area of economic interventionism, with the potentially deep-
est impact on the economy in the longer term.
5.1. Interest rate cuts
Virtually all major central banks have reacted to the crisis with massive 
interest rate cuts. The average of the short-term* policy rates of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve (Fed), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of 
England (BoE), the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC) has declined by more than 3 percentage points, i.e. from 4.27% 
p.a. in June 2007 to 1.17% p.a. since May 2009 (data until October 2009). 
In the United Kingdom, for instance, the currently applied rate of 0.5% 
is historically the lowest rate ever since the Bank of England was estab-
lished in 1694 (see Figure 10).
Figure 10 - Interest rates (Short-term policy rates, in % 
per annum, 2000-2009)
Graph by Thomas A. Zimmermann; Data source: International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) / International Financial Statistics (IFS); provided through Principal 
Global Indicators; http://www.principalglobalindiactors.org
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5.2. Quantitative easing
With rates having reached such low levels, the scope for further rate 
cuts has mostly been exhausted. Central banks have therefore engaged 
in so-called measures of ‘quantitative easing’ in order to further prop up 
credit markets and pump liquidity into the system. By engaging in such 
practices, they also contributed – at least for the time being – to keeping 
long-term interest rates down. Quantitative easing has taken on various 
forms; the most important instruments are purchases of government 
and corporate bonds as well as other securities.
Through these purchases, central banks supported the expansionary 
fiscal policies of governments and their deficit-spending efforts with a 
view to safeguarding the stability of financial systems and to upholding 
activity levels in their economies. By pumping enormous amounts of 
liquidity into the system, they have also sustained asset prices with a 
view to preventing the balances of banks, but also private households 
and other institutions (e.g. pension funds) from eroding. In doing so, 
they have managed to contain deflationary trends and to keep inflation 
expectations stable – at least for the time being.
Figure 11 - Expansion of Central Bank balance sheets in major economies
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2009; p. 28; http://www.imf.org
The proportions of these central bank interventions are unprecedent-
ed. The balance sheets of central banks have expanded massively. 
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According to IMF data, the balance sheet of the Bank of England 
more than tripled between June 2007 and 2009. Other central banks 
with a considerable increase of their balance sheets are the Swedish 
Riksbank, the Swiss National Bank, and the U.S. Fed. As far as the 
ECB and the Bank of Canada are concerned, their balance sheets 
have increased rather moderately in relation to their previous levels 
– as did the bank balance sheets of most emerging and developing 
countries (see Figure 11).
An impressive reflection of this quantitative easing is the historic 
expansion of the adjusted monetary base in the United States. Figure 
12 tracks this indicator for roughly the last one hundred years and 
shows the uniqueness of the 2008/2009 policy actions.
Figure 12 - Expansion of the adjusted monetary base in the United States, 
1918-2009, in billions of U.S. Dollars
Graph by Thomas A. Zimmermann; Data source: Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis: Data downloaded on 6 January 2010; Series AMBNS, St. Louis 
Adjusted Monetary Base; http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/
AMBNS?cid=124.
Further measures include adjusted reserve requirements, longer fund-
ing terms, more frequent auctions and/or higher credit lines. They 
also include an enhancing of the function of central banks as the lend-
er of last resort through a broader set of eligible institutions, wider 
collateral rules and/or broader definitions of eligible collateral. In ad-
dition, central banks have also made use of their capacity as foreign 
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exchange lenders of last resorts – i.e. by establishing foreign exchange 
swap lines with other central banks or forex repos33.
Finally, the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its 
greatly expanded crisis-related programs and lending activities could 
also be mentioned in this context34.
5.3. Exchange rate interventions
In addition to interest rates cuts and quantitative easing, some mon-
etary authorities have also made use of interventions on foreign 
exchange markets. 
A country that is regularly accused of manipulating its exchange 
rate is China. In fact, the Chinese central bank had never allowed its 
currency, the Yuan/Renminbi, to float freely against the US-Dollar. 
The chronically high trade surpluses of China (in combination with a 
deep trade deficit in the US) and the massive accumulation of reserves 
are a reflection of the macro-economic imbalances that allegedly were 
(and still are) among the facets of this crisis. After having kept its 
exchange rate stable to the U.S. Dollar throughout the late nineties 
and until 2005 at roughly 0.12 USD/CNY (or 8.28 CNY/USD), China 
accepted a gradual appreciation of the Yuan/Renminbi against the 
U.S. Dollar between 2005 and 2008 until an exchange rate of rough-
ly 0.146 USD/CNY (or 6.8 CNY/USD) had been reached. However, 
since summer 2008, the authorities have again kept their exchange 
rate fairly stable against the USD at this level (see Graph 13). Research 
published by the Peterson Institute for International Economics in 
2009 finds that the Yuan/Renminbi was undervalued by 21%35.
33 For an overview of these measures, see also Table 3.1 in IMF, Global Financial 
Stability Report 2009, Chapter 3, p. 4. For the context of fiscal policy measures to 
stabilise financial markets, see also Section 4.3. On ‘unconventional measures’ in 
general, see C. BORIO - P. DISYATAT, Unconvential monetary policies – An Appraisal, BIS 
Working Papers, 292, 2009. Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work292.pdf 
and BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (BIS) (ed.) 79th Annual Report, BIS, Basel 29 
June 2009. Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2009e.pdf, Chapter VI.
34 See International Monetary Fund (IMF) (ed.), Review of Recent Crisis Programs, 
IMF, Washington, D.C., 14 September 2009. Available at http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/pp/eng/2009/091409.pdf for details.
35 See W.R. CLINE. - J. WILLIAMSON, Estimates of Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange 
Rates, «Policy Brief» No. PB 09-10, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, D.C. June 2009. Available at http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/
pb09-10.pdf, p. 7 and Table 2.
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Figure 13 - Exchange rate Chinese Yuan/Renminbi in US Dollars, 1995-2009
Graph by Thomas A. Zimmermann; Data source: Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis: Data downloaded on 6 January 2010; available at http://research.
stlouisfed.org/ fred2/categories/15 
Another example of a country that has recently targeted its exchange 
rate is Switzerland. In its monetary policy assessment on 12 March 2009, 
the Swiss National Bank (SNB) stated that «[d]ecisive action [...] to force-
fully relax monetary conditions» was called for, and that it would «act to 
prevent any further appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro. To 
this end, [the Swiss National Bank] will increase liquidity substantially 
by engaging in additional repo operations, buying Swiss franc bonds 
issued by private sector borrowers and purchasing foreign currency on 
the foreign exchange markets».
The announcement of 12 March 2009 was immediately felt on for-
eign exchange markets: The Euro rose from below 1.47 CHF to close 
to 1.54 CHF (interbank rate; see Figure 14). Amidst occasional ru-
mours about SNB interventions and the markets’ hypothesis that the 
Swiss National Bank would defend an exchange rate of 1.50 CHF/EUR, 
the Euro stayed above this ‘line in the sand’ through most of the year. 
However, the Franc began to appreciate again after the SNB had slightly 
changed the wording in its monetary assessment of 10 December 2009. 
In this assessment, the SNB merely stated that it would «act decisively to 
prevent any excessive appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro». 
Markets reportedly interpreted this softening of language (‘prevent any 
106 THOMAS A. ZIMMERMANN
excessive appreciation’ versus ‘prevent any further appreciation’) as a sof-
tening of the SNB stance. The Euro closed the third week of 2010 at an 
interbank exchange rate of slightly more than 1.47 CHF/EUR. 
Figure 14 - Exchange Rate CHF/EUR, 1 January 2009 – 9 January 2010 
(in Swiss Francs per 1 Euro)
Graph by Thomas A. Zimmermann; Data source: OANDA website, historical 
exchange rates (interbank rates), http://www.oanda.com/lang/de/currency/ 
historical-rates; SWISS NATIONAL BANK (2009), and SWISS NATIONAL BANK (2009a)
The interventions on exchange markets by China in particular have been 
criticised by both academic observers and policymakers. The reluctance 
of the authorities to let the Yuan/Renminbi float freely is a major irri-
tant in the U.S. and is considered an impediment on the way towards the 
removal of international macroeconomic imbalances. In combination 
with the weaker U.S. Dollar, the fixed Yuan/Renminbi-Dollar exchange 
rates have become onerous for those currency areas that let their cur-
rencies float freely against the USD, such as the Euro.
BERGSTEN (2009) – as one of the fiercest critics of China’s exchange 
rate policies – has also criticised Switzerland, stating that «its aggressive, 
although admirably transparent, intervention in the currency markets 
has served to weaken the exchange rate of the Swiss Franc despite the 
country’s huge current account surpluses». He argues that «over the 
next few years, as more countries seek to export their way out of the cur-
rent crisis and build larger war chests of foreign exchange to self-insure 
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against future exigencies, there could be more, and more serious, exam-
ples of such neomercantilism».
Apart from the criticism voiced by BERGSTEN, criticism of the Swiss 
policies has, however, remained fairly moderate. Indeed, there are sev-
eral noteworthy differences between the Chinese and the Swiss case: 
i.) Switzerland, unlike China, has an open capital market and the Swiss 
franc, unlike the Chinese Yuan Renminbi, is a freely convertible cur-
rency; ii.) The Swiss franc, unlike the Chinese Yuan/Renminbi, has the 
character of a safe haven currency which makes it vulnerable to appre-
ciation in situations of international monetary turmoil; iii.) Switzerland 
is a far smaller player in the world economy than China, and is not the 
root cause of comparable international imbalances; iv.) The SNB has, 
in preventing an uncontrolled appreciation of its currency, contributed 
considerably to financial stability in Eastern and Central Europe (e.g. 
Poland and Hungary) where a high share of mortgages and credits is 
denominated in Swiss francs. Finally, the SNB has recently softened its 
stance somewhat – unlike China which has so far insisted on pursuing its 
current exchange rate policy.
Apart from China and Switzerland, there are other countries that 
have recently taken action indirectly to ward off an appreciation of their 
respective currencies: for instance, Brazil has introduced a tax of 2% on 
foreign portfolio investments in Brazilian stocks and bonds to deter cap-
ital inflows. Taiwan has banned foreign inflows in time deposits. More 
Asian emerging markets have recently intervened to avoid appreciations 
of their currency and to deter massive capital inflows as interest rates 
remain on record lows in advanced economies. On 7 January 2010, the 
new Japanese Finance Minister, NAOTO KAN, said in his inaugural press 
conference that he would like the Japanese Yen to weaken ‘a bit more’ 
after it had already dropped 9% from its 14-year high in November 2009. 
Markets reacted to this verbal intervention with the Yen losing value on 
currency markets.
6. The return of interventionism: Main findings from the analysis
6.1. Trade policy: Increased protectionism, but no catastrophe so far
The preceding chapters make it clear that governments have made fre-
quent recourse to economic interventionism in their efforts to ward off 
the effects of the economic crisis, in particular with regard to avoiding a 
financial meltdown and rising unemployment.
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The flurry of trade policy measures clearly shows a rise of protec-
tionism, particularly in mature industries suffering overcapacities as well 
as in financial services. At the same time, there is little momentum to-
wards trade liberalisation – particularly on the multilateral level. Both 
findings suggest that we will have to live with a higher level of global 
protectionism for some time to come. The good news, however, is that 
protectionism has not yet increased to an extent which would have led 
to a 1930s style breakdown of world trade or to escalating, large-scale 
trade wars. It should be noted, however, that a large number of pro-
tectionist measures are still in the pipeline. Protectionist measures take 
some time to be designed and to be put into effect. Moreover, in case 
the world economy were not able to sustain its recovery (e.g. in the case 
of a so-called ‘double dip recession’), protectionist pressures might well 
increase further. In sum, it is therefore too early for a final assessment.
6.2. Investment policy: A relatively comforting picture
The analysis of investment policy measures has brought overall comfort-
ing results: although the trend towards investment liberalisation has lost 
some momentum in the 2nd half of the last decade, the measures liber-
alising international investment still outnumber the restrictive ones. An 
exception to this fairly positive picture is Latin America where hostile at-
titudes towards FDI and foreign multinationals are on the rise. Another 
edifying result is that the financial and economic crisis has not specifi-
cally pushed investment policy towards protectionism. By contrast to its 
effects on trade policy, the crisis even seems to have pushed some coun-
tries into a more liberal stance towards international investment. A good 
example in case is the attitude towards Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs).
6.3. Fiscal Policy: An alarming picture
Despite the number of the trade and investment policy measures taken 
during the crisis, the weight of interventions in these areas is dwarfed 
by the actions taken in fiscal and monetary policy. In fiscal policy, enor-
mous amounts of money have been spent to stimulate the economy 
and to save ailing banks. Given the sheer size of government assistance 
during this crisis (as measured as a percentage of GDP), the enormous 
potential of stimulus and emergency measures as sources of economic 
distortions becomes apparent. Several risks emerge.
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6.3.1. Microeconomic threats: The risk of state failure
Through the emergency measures taken, governments have become 
deeply involved in the management of banks and other companies. This 
raises challenges with regard to potential conflicts of interest inside the 
government – e.g. between the government’s primary role as a regula-
tor versus its newly acquired role as a banker or industrial entrepreneur 
(e.g. in granting credits, in enforcing competition policy etc.)36. This 
conflict of roles poses serious threats to sound economic governance.
Political pressures against a rapid divestment and in favour of 
perpetuating the political control of the acquired businesses will in-
crease, in particular from the interventionist and statist camps. The 
public (co-)ownership of firms will also pose challenges for the non-
discriminatory treatment of investors, including upon divestment. 
The discretion enjoyed in the negotiations and structuring of deals 
may lead to favouring certain firms over others, e.g. with a view to 
creating ‘national champions’.
6.3.2. Macro-economic consequences: An unsustainable debt burden
The combined effects of automatic stabilizers (i.e. reduced tax income 
and/or increased social security spending), stimulus measures, and 
emergency support have a deep impact on government finances. In 
addition, risks to government finances through the provision of guaran-
tees (e.g. in the case of Ireland, where such guarantees amount to 261% 
of GDP) have increased sharply.
The degradation of government finances as a consequence of the 
crisis is therefore of little surprise. This degradation is much worse in 
advanced countries with their heavily affected financial sectors than in 
emerging markets. Figure 15 illustrates the differing IMF projections 
36 An analysis of the effect of government ownership of banks on bank lending is 
included P. SAPIENZA, The effects of government ownership on bank lending, «Journal 
of Financial Economics», 72 (2004), 2, pp. 357-384. Available at http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2002.10.002. His findings (p. 359) «support the political view 
of [state-owned enterprises] and suggest that state-owned banks serve as a mechanism 
to supply political patronage». The findings also «show that government ownership 
of banks has distorting effects on the financial allocation of resources». See also R. 
LA PORTA - F. LOPEZ-DE-SILANES - A. SHLEIFER, Government Ownership of Banks, Harvard 
University, SSRN, Cambridge, MA, 2000 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=236434) on the negative effects of a politicised allocation 
of financial resources on productivity and growth. On the issue of state versus pri-
vate ownership in general, see A. SHLEIFER, State versus Private Ownership, «Journal 
of Economic Perspectives», 12 (1998), 4, pp. 133-150. Available at http://www.jstor.
org/stable/2646898?origin=JSTOR-pdf.
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for public finances in advanced G-20 countries and in emerging G-20 
countries. Despite a presumed moderation of the deficits after 2009, the 
overall government debt level is expected to increase to beyond 110% of 
GDP by 2014 in advanced countries (Figure 15a). Compare this to the 
projections of the IMF for emerging G-20 countries which, thanks to 
much smaller deficits, should be able to reduce overall government debt 
to roughly 35% by 2014 – a third of the then level in advanced countries.
Figure 15 - G-20 Countries: Outlook for Public Finances
a) Advanced G-20 countries
b) Emerging market G-20 countries
Source: IMF (2009b), p. 23.
Whereas the projected evolution of government finances until 2014 
alone would already be sufficient reason for concern, the picture gets 
even more worrisome if we consider the IMF forecast for the next four 
decades. Until 2050, the IMF currently expects fairly steep increases 
in the share of government debt into the sphere of 300% of GDP for 
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advanced countries (see Figure 16), with population ageing and demo-
graphic developments taking their toll.
Figure 16 - Advanced G-20 Countries: Government Debt
Source: IMF (2009b), p. 39.
It is difficult to perceive how the ageing (and partially shrinking) popu-
lations in the developed economies will ever be able to stabilise, let 
alone repay, this ballooning debt. Rather, social security systems with 
insufficient coverage and/or inadequate investments (e.g. into public 
debt which needs to be serviced by the insured population itself), as 
well as existing private debts, could add to increasing serfdom of indi-
viduals.
Since interest rates may be expected to rise again from their histori-
cally low levels (in particular as far as risk premia and inflation premia 
are concerned, in the light of the decreased creditworthiness of bor-
rowers), this burden will likely become even more onerous. Whatever 
strategy will be chosen by governments to cope with this debt – massive 
tax increases, inflation, sweeping cuts in public services, or a combi-
nation of these – the adjustment process is likely to be painful and 
to gnaw at the prosperity of generations to come. In the light of the 
demographic decline, the saturation of markets and the magnitude of 
the debt issue, a comfortable way out, which would be built on a swift 
return of high growth rates, is not a realistic option. Nor is a miracu-
lous increase of tax income through some Laffer curve effects from 
lower tax rates.
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6.4. Monetary policy: Unknown risks in unknown territory
Besides fiscal policy, monetary policy has been the major area of inter-
ventionism. As far as the interest rate reductions are concerned, these are 
quite commonplace as an instrument of monetary policy, and they are con-
tinuously used by monetary authorities in the conduct of their business. 
Their effects and side-effects on the economy are fairly straightforward. 
The interest rate reductions may be considered the least discretionary and 
the least discriminatory element in the monetary toolbox that was used 
during this crisis.
The same cannot be said for the unprecedented ‘unconventional’ meas-
ures that were taken by central banks during this crisis – in particular the 
‘quantitative easing’ measures. Conventional wisdom would suggest that 
such an expansion of the monetary base will likely lead to massive infla-
tion in the future. Critics of this assumption argue, however, that credit 
channels remain clogged for some time (due to the need of both financial 
institutions and a large number of private borrowers to restore their bal-
ance sheets) and that the output gap is too large for allowing inflation to 
rise. Nevertheless, the huge amounts of liquidity may sooner or later find 
their way into markets, if they are not mopped up in due time. They may 
increase the prices of certain real estate, stocks and tangible assets (e.g. raw 
materials) and trickle from there into other parts of the economy. It could 
also be argued that current price stability still owes much to the fairly well-
anchored inflation expectations which, in turn, are built on the experience 
of the ‘great moderation’ in the last 25 years. If these expectations were to 
even gradually de-anchor, prices could develop more momentum. 
More generally, the effect of monetary policies should not be consid-
ered in isolation but against the background of other areas of intervention, 
i.e. the massive fiscal expansion in particular. Fears that Western central 
banks and Western governments could collaborate in inflating at least 
some of the onerous debt burden away, seem fairly plausible. A possible 
indicator for future inflation expectations and for monetary instability is 
the gold price (see Figure 17), since gold is largely a ‘monetary commodity’ 
of limited industrial value. The willingness to hoard this non-interest bear-
ing asset – which manifests itself in massive capital inflows into Gold ETFs 
(Exchange Traded Funds) and in the return of central banks as net buyers 
of the yellow metal – may also be interpreted as a loss of confidence in 
the willingness and/or ability of governments and central banks to restore 
macroeconomic stability37.
37 On the role of gold as a hedge against macro-economic imprudence, see, for 
instance, the piece by A. GREENSPAN, Gold and Economic Freedom in A. RAND (ed.), 
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Figure 17 - The Gold Price (2000-2009); USD/ounce; 
Daily London pm Gold Fixing
Graph by Thomas A. Zimmermann; Data source: World Gold Council website. 
http://www.gold.org/deliver.php?file=/value/stats/statistics/xls/web_daily.xls 
Whereas low interest rates and quantitative easing can indirectly have pro-
tectionist effects (through depreciations of the currencies concerned), 
interventions on foreign exchange markets (and pegged exchange rates 
more generally) have a direct effect on trade flows. Distortions may be ex-
pected in particular from the pegging of the Chinese Yuan/Renminbi to 
the U.S. Dollar at a low exchange rate – in light of the estimated extent 
of the undervaluation on the one hand, and in light of China’s weight in 
world trade on the other. This likely perpetuates international imbalances.
6.5. Overall assessment: Economic interventionism has returned
In an overall assessment of the policy areas surveyed in this paper, it may 
be said that governments and central banks around the globe have made 
use of a wide array of tools to fight against the financial and economic 
Capitalism – The Unknown Ideal, Signet, The New American Library Inc., New York 
1967, pp. 96-101.
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crisis. Whereas these measures may have helped to contain the slump in 
economic activity as well as deflationary threats, their cumulative effect 
has also been a steep increase in the amount of interventionism in the 
economy.
The Schumpeterian concept of ‘creative destruction’ and the subse-
quent structural change have not been allowed to proceed at the pace 
dictated by the markets. Governments around the globe have replaced pri-
vate demand through government demand or through incentives steering 
demand into specific sectors affected by the crisis. Ultimately, such tax-
financed or debt-financed stimulus schemes withdraw sovereignty from 
consumers and prevent the necessary capacity adjustments. 
The artificial conservation of overcapacities and hypertrophic eco-
nomic activity is unsustainable – from an economic, financial, social and 
ecological point of view. The measures taken, although successful in the 
short run, are associated with costs and risks in the medium to long term. 
Gravitation cannot be conned in the long run.
In the medium term, rising bond yields, interest rates and increased 
inflation may already begin to materialise before the economic and finan-
cial crisis is fully over. The currently steep yield curve is a warning sign. 
Increasing costs of debt service may enforce painful spending cuts and a 
weaker public service in the more indebted countries, reducing prosperity 
and the quality of life. At the same time, protectionist distortions and high-
er taxation will be millstones around advanced economies’ neck, further 
hampering their limited growth perspectives. Additional difficulties – such 
as increasing resource prices resulting from stronger demand in emerging 
market economies and the expanded monetary base – may add to the chal-
lenges for policymakers in the North.
In the longer term, the crisis may act as a catalyst for the global shift 
that is already taking place. Huge public debts and the political dominance 
of an ageing, risk-averse population in the North will fuel internal and in-
ternational distribution conflicts. These are set to weaken the position 
of advanced countries in economic, political, and – ultimately – military 
terms. This erosion may proceed at a faster or slower pace, depending 
upon many factors. One crucial factor will be the extent to which the U.S. 
Dollar will be able to reaffirm itself as the world’s leading currency, con-
veying a vital role and considerable benefits of seignorage to the United 
States38.
From a liberal economist’s point of view, one of the regrettable aspects 
is that the current problems will be attributed rather to allegedly ‘neo-liber-
38 For a recently published overview on the role of the U.S. Dollar, see WTO, Overview 
of Developments, 2009, Part B, Chapter C.
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al’ economic policies of the past than to past interventions of governments 
and central banks. It is easily forgotten that the current financial crisis 
was first and foremost the result of an overly lax U.S. monetary policy 
and the government-sponsored mortgage frenzy, i.e. a de-facto period of 
Keynesianism in the aftermath of 9-11 and the bursting of the technology 
bubble in 2000/2001. By heavily engaging in economic interventionism 
once more, governments and central banks are now repeating the same 
kind of actions, albeit at a larger scale, that led to this crisis in the first 
place.
7. Policy options
In this last chapter of the paper, we will discuss some policy options to 
address the problem of rising interventionism and to return to more 
market-oriented policies. In the light of the broad scope of this paper, 
we will present an overview of policy approaches rather than a detailed 
discussion of each and every issue.
7.1. Trade policy: Monitoring, dispute settlement and negotiations
Monitoring: In the light of the manifold pressures towards protectionist 
measures, monitoring efforts must continue. They ensure the transpar-
ency of trade policy actions, thereby also creating normative pressure 
against protectionism. Beyond the monitoring efforts of international 
organisations such as the WTO, private efforts from initiatives such as 
Global Trade Alert (GTA) are most welcome because they are more inde-
pendent in their analysis than the ‘member-driven’ WTO. 
Dispute settlement: Governments should make active use of the dispute 
settlement mechanisms in the WTO and under regional trade agree-
ments by challenging their trade partners’ violations of trade rules. 
Export-oriented business and trade associations should lobby with their 
governments for a defence of their foreign commercial interest in these 
fora. Governments occasionally tend to shy away from bringing com-
plaints because these may be considered unfriendly diplomatic actions 
and provoke counter-complaints from the defendants39. From an econom-
ic perspective, however, an active use of dispute settlement mechanisms 
39 See ZIMMERMANN, Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
Cameron May, London 2006 (available at http://www.zimmermann -thomas.de/
publikationen/zimmermann_2006_book_dsu.pdf) with further references.
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is desirable – and a far better option than a cartelistic agreement between 
governments not to challenge each other’s violations any more. 
On-going WTO negotiations: Even if the chances for an agreement are 
dim, WTO Members should carry on in their efforts to negotiate on a 
Doha package, pursuing reasonable results. On-going negotiations about 
further liberalisation reduce the risk of a protectionist backlash. This re-
quires, however, a more active participation from several major parties. In 
particular, the United States should finally make its strategy for the Doha 
Round clear. Moreover, emerging economies should assume greater re-
sponsibility for the system and leave their conceptions of asymmetrical 
concessions behind. The private sector could also engage more actively, 
pressing lawmakers and governments towards more ambition in trade ne-
gotiations.
FTA negotiations: Although Free-Trade Agreements are only a sec-
ond best solution for international trade liberalisation (with multilateral 
agreements being the first best option), they provide an additional safety 
net for open trade and allow to lock-in concessions, particularly in times 
where protectionist pressures increase. Countries should therefore con-
tinue their efforts to strike more free-trade deals while making sure that 
such deals have the least possible trade-diverting effect and do not create 
new obstacles for multilateral liberalisation. The respect of the rules laid 
down in Art. XXIV GATT40, the use of provisions that are supportive of 
the multilateral trading system, and the definition of liberal rules of ori-
gin (in general, and for the cumulation of value-added) are required.
Other policy options: Other possible policy options include self-commit-
ments of governments not to introduce protectionist measures, and to 
phase out existing measures (e.g. anti-dumping duties, CVDs, safeguards, 
etc.) as soon as possible. In general, unilateral steps towards trade liber-
alisation host much economic potential for the liberalising country. An 
example in case is the unilateral introduction of the Cassis de Dijon prin-
ciple in Switzerland which amounts to a unilateral removal of technical 
barriers to trade. Another possible (and, in fact, long overdue) step to-
wards unilateral liberalisation is the elimination of nuisance duties (i.e. 
duties of below 2%) or low duties in general. This step would bear only 
relatively small political costs but it could considerably facilitate traders’ 
business if applied to broadly defined product categories. Nuisance duties 
cause high administrative costs without yielding much government rev-
enue and without offering much bargaining value in trade negotiations.
40 Art. XXIV GATT establishes basic principles which free-trade agreements should 
fulfill in order to be compatible with multilateral trade rules. These include the pro-
hibition of raising barriers to trade with non-parties, notification requirements as 
well as rules for the scope of FTAs and the timing of their implementation.
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Long run options: In the longer run, more fundamental and more crea-
tive measures will be required to maintain the multilateral trading system 
as a productive instrument for trade liberalisation. These might include 
a new approach towards negotiations (e.g. plurilateral negotiations or 
new rules for decision-taking), as the current negotiating methods do not 
yield impressive results any more in an organization of 150+ members41. 
In addition, a better anchoring of the freedom of transaction in domestic 
law should be considered (e.g. through attribution of direct effect to key 
WTO or FTA rules). Similarly, granting private parties the right to invoke 
the dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO and FTAs (similar to 
investor-state disputes under the ICSID42 convention) could provide an 
additional instrument to enforce agreed-upon principles. Such measures, 
which may seem utopian from today’s perspective, have long been the 
subject of academic and policy-oriented debates. They may each have 
specific disadvantages, but should nevertheless be brought forward once 
again43.
7.2. Investment policy: Monitoring and enforcement
Monitoring: For the same reasons pointed out above (see Section 7.1. on 
trade policy), continued monitoring of investment measures through the 
OECD, UNCTAD, other international institutions and private initiatives 
such as GTA should continue. 
Enforcement: Countries and investors should make use, to the maximum 
extent possible, of the dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms 
laid down in international investment instruments against violations of 
agreed-upon investment disciplines. Such action raises the cost of pro-
tectionist measures (including reputation costs) and therefore deters 
potential violators.
41 Proposals for reform have been made, inter alia, in CONSULTATIVE BOARD (2004) and 
T. COTTIER - S. TAKENOSHITA, The Balance of Power in WTO Decision-Making – Towards 
Weighted Voting in Legislative Response, in «Aussenwirtschaft», 59 (2003), 2, pp. 171-214.
42 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.
43 See, for instance, S. CHARNOVITZ, The WTO and the Rights of the Individual, 
«Intereconomics – Review of European Economic Policy» 36 (2001), 2, pp. 98-108; 
P.C. MAVROIDIS ET AL., Is the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Responsive to the Needs 
of the Traders? Would a System of Direct Action by Private Parties Yield Better Results? 
Panel Discussion at the 6th Geneva Global Arbitration Forum, «Journal of World 
Trade» 32 (1998), 2, pp. 147-165 and G.T. SCHLEYER Power to the People – Allowing 
Private Parties to Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, «Fordham Law 
Review», 65 (1997), pp. 2275ff. on elements of this discussion.
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On-going negotiations on investment rules: With no major multilateral 
investment initiative in sight, countries mostly rely on a variety of instru-
ments for the international regulation of cross-border investment, i.e. 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT), Double Taxation Treaties (DTT; on 
tax matters), investment provisions in regional trade agreements, the 
TRIMS44 in the WTO, and existing OECD instruments. In the absence of 
a broad-based multilateral agreement to protect investments, countries 
should continue to actively use and further develop such treaties with 
a view to providing a safety net and enhanced legal security for interna-
tional investment. Such on-going negotiations also tend to counteract 
protectionist trends and help to lock-in past achievements.
Long-term options: Previous negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment (MAI) in the OECD between 1995 and 1998 have failed 
and efforts to integrate investment provisions into the WTO have met a 
cool response so far, particularly from developing countries. Nevertheless, 
seeking an agreement on a basic set of globally applicable rules for FDI 
might be worth a second attempt. The world has changed over the last 
12 years, as emerging and developing countries have themselves become 
major home countries of foreign direct investment (e.g. South-South in-
vestment, South-North investment, SWFs).
7.3. Fiscal policy: Making budget consolidation the top priority
Communication of exit strategies: In order to restore fiscal discipline, prevent 
public finances from a continued degradation, and safeguard confidence 
in governments, the trend towards ever increasing public expenditure 
needs to be broken. This can best be achieved through timely, credible, 
and scheduled proposals by governments on how they plan to cut expen-
ditures. The IMF45 recommends that fiscal stimulus packages should not 
have permanent effects on deficits; that frameworks with clearly defined 
policies and appropriate institutional arrangements should provide a 
commitment to fiscal correction.
Timely withdrawal of the government as entrepreneur: Government involve-
ment in the management of otherwise privately run businesses (through 
guarantees, credits or outright ownership) should end at the earliest con-
venience, and before vested interests emerge that seek to perpetuate the 
44 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures.
45 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) (ed.), Fiscal Implications of the Global 
Economic and Financial Crisis, IMF Staff Position Note, Doc. SPN/09/13, IMF, 
Washington, D.C., 9 June 2009. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ 
ft/spn/2009/spn0913.pdf, p. 3.
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control of government over specific firms or sectors. With regard to aid to 
the financial sector, sunset clauses on deposit insurance or bond guaran-
tees, as well as punitive conditions of government capital injections (e.g. 
limitations on pay and bonuses) can contribute to a timely exit. 
Making use of international instruments to contain fiscal activism: Although 
fiscal policy is largely a matter of domestic law and policy, there are some 
international instruments that can be used in order to contain the trend 
of governments to expand. For example, rules in the WTO and/or in the 
EU limit the scope of governments in granting subsidies. Another exam-
ple is the Stability and Growth Pact in the EU which foresees warnings 
and sanctions against members without fiscal discipline. The partially 
poor application and enforcement of these rules in the past should not 
serve as a pretext of not applying them more strictly in the future.
Long-term measure: Stabilising public finances, revisiting the role of the state 
and implementing budget rules: In light of the magnitude of the debt/deficit 
problem, a radical departure from the general trend of the last four dec-
ades is required and the role of the state must be revisited more generally. 
Since 1970, the share of government disbursements as a percentage of 
GDP has continuously risen, as illustrated in Graph 18. For the OECD 
countries surveyed, this share ranges today between 31.3% in Korea and 
56.0% in Sweden. Since 1970, the increase of this share has been 13.6 per-
centage points on average, ranging between a minimum of 9.2 percentage 
points in the United States and a maximum of 23.9 percentage points in 
the case of Spain, where the share of government disbursement in GDP 
has practically doubled in 40 years. This trend needs to be stopped, if 
any room for private economic initiative is to be left. As a key instrument 
of implementation, the introduction of budget rules (e.g. the Swiss debt 
brake) should be considered46. In states with decentralised governments 
(federations), reforming the fiscal relationship between the federal and 
the sub-federal level with a view to a clearer assignment of fiscal respon-
sibilities, may contribute to successful fiscal adjustment47. Structural 
reforms should be implemented to enhance growth, and countries fac-
ing demographic pressures should embrace health and pension reforms. 
46 On the effectiveness of budget rules in general, see J.M. POTERBA (1997): Do Budget 
Rules Work?, NBER Working Paper 5550, October 1997. Available at http://papers.
nber.org/papers/w5550.pdf.
47 See C.A. SCHALTEGGER - L.P. FELD, Are fiscal adjustments less successful in decentralized 
governments? «European Journal of Political Economy», 25, 1, March 2009, pp. 115-123 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.08.002) with further references.
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Such reforms should be undertaken rather sooner than later, given the 
inherent delays in fiscal stabilisation processes48.
Figure 18 - Total disbursements, general government, as a percentage of GDP: 
Situation in 2010 and Change between 1970 and 2010
Graph: Thomas A. Zimmermann; Data Source: OECD/OECD Economic Outlook 
Database, No. 86, Annual Data; vol. 2009/Issue No. 3 as per 4 January 2009; 
Source OECD: http://titania.sourceoecd.org/database/oecdeconomic outlook
Tax reforms should be considered but not with the primary aim of revenue in-
creases: In the light of the growth of the state, fiscal consolidation should 
normally be achieved through lower expenditure and not through 
higher taxes. This recommendation is in line with evidence from re-
search, suggesting that fiscal consolidations relying on spending cuts 
tend to be expansionary whereas consolidations relying on tax increases 
48 See A. ALESINA - A. DRAZEN, Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?, «American Economic 
Review», 18, 5 (December 1991), pp. 1170-1188, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/2006912?origin=JSTOR-pdf, with further references. On recent research on fis-
cal adjustments in general, see also S. GUICHARD ET AL., What Promotes Fiscal Consolidation 
– OECD Country Experiences, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 553, 
OECD, Paris 2007. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/180833424370.
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tend to be contractionary49. In exceptional cases only, where such an 
approach would not be sufficient to restore the creditworthiness of a 
public entity, increased taxation could provide some temporary relief as 
ultima ratio. However, if taxes need to rise, the problem of the efficiency 
costs from increased taxation should be taken into account. The vast 
body of literature on optimal taxation can give some guidance on the 
criteria for modern tax systems and tax reform50. In the context of tax 
reform, policymakers could also address the debt-bias inherent in some 
tax systems. This includes corporate-level taxes that favour debt finance 
(including in the financial sector) and continued favourable treatment 
of housing (e.g. the tax deductibility of mortgage payments). This debt 
bias or, more generally, the lack of neutrality in the tax treatment of dif-
ferent financial arrangements, constitutes an intervention which creates 
macro-relevant distortions by fostering excessive leveraging in entire 
economies. These distortions should be removed51.
7.4. Monetary policy: A timely exit and a revisited monetary policy 
target
Timely monetary tightening: After some countries have already started 
monetary tightening (e.g. Israel, Australia and Norway), monetary au-
thorities in other countries will have to think about a timely departure 
from the current lax monetary policies, too, if they wish to maintain 
their credibility and public confidence in central banks. This will not 
be an easy task, because higher interest rates and the unwinding of 
49 For recent research, see A. ALESINA - S. ARDAGNA: Large Changes in Fiscal Policy 
– Taxes Versus Spending, NBER Working Paper 15438, issued in October 2009, re-
vised version of 12 January 2010 (http://www.nber.org/papers/w15438), as well 
as C.D. ROMER - D.H. ROMER, The Macroeconomic Effect of Tax Changes – Estimates 
Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks, NBER Working Paper W13264, July 2007 
(http://www.nber.org/papers/w13264); the latter found that an exogenous tax in-
crease of one percent of GDP lowers real GDP by roughly three percent (p. 42). See 
also A. ALESINA - R. PEROTTI - J. TAVARES, The Political Economy of Fiscal Adjustments, 
«Brooking Papers on Economic Activity», 1 (1998), pp. 197-266 (JSTOR, http://
www.jstor.org/stable/2534672?origin=JSTOR-pdf); A. ALESINA - S. ARDAGNA, Tales of 
Fiscal Adjustment, «Economic Policy», 13 (1998), 27, pp. 489-545. Available at JSTOR, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344762?origin=JSTOR-pdf.
50 See, for instance, H.S. ROSEN - T. GAYER, Public Finance, 8th edition, Mc Graw Hill, 
Boston,MA, 2008, Part IV.
51 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RUND (IMF) (ed.), Debt Bias and Other Distortions – 
Crisis-Related Issues in Tax Policy, IMF, Washington D.C., 12 June 2009. Available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/061209.pdf, Chapters II and III.
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quantitative easing will raise borrowing costs and weigh on bond pric-
es (pushing up yields), thus making investments and government debt 
service more costly. The alternative, though, is barely more attractive: 
Where excess liquidity is not withdrawn in a timely manner, it will flow 
into real assets such as commodities and will translate into higher in-
flation expectations; de-anchored inflation expectations would also 
raise borrowing costs through inflation premia and deter investment in 
general. Politically, monetary tightening will therefore require difficult 
choices, and timing will be a challenge. Technically, this issue appears to 
be less difficult as central banks can have recourse to a variety of instru-
ments, mirroring the options they have used in the process of monetary 
easing: increasing interest rates, selling assets (including under repur-
chase agreements), modifying reserve requirements and interest rates 
on reserves, non-renewal of refinancing operations, terminating or ad-
justing funding facilities, normalising collateral rules, eliminating forex 
swap lines etc. Further measures could be the issuance of central banks’ 
own debt in order to bind liquidity52.
Long-term measures: revisiting the monetary policy target: Central banks 
have largely focused on consumer price levels as their monetary tar-
get, neglecting asset prices and emerging bubbles. In the light of the 
enormous economic and social costs of the financial crisis which has re-
sulted, at least partly, from too lax monetary policies and the bursting of 
the subsequent U.S. housing bubble, central banks may want to include 
the development of asset prices in their monetary policy assessments as 
well. Research undertaken suggests that there is scope for central banks 
to increasingly ‘lean against the wind’ of emerging asset price bubbles, 
as the latter are usually related to a build-up of leverage in the economy, 
as reflected by money and credit growth53.
Freeing exchange rates: There is no consensus in economic literature 
on whether floating or fixed exchange rates yield better results in the 
long run. The author of this paper subscribes to the view that freely 
floating exchange rates constitute necessary valves in the global econo-
my and that the crisis has even increased their importance in the light of 
the large differences in macro-economic conditions between single cur-
rency areas (i.e. regarding economic growth rates and growth potential, 
52 See also BIS, 79th Annual report, p. 123f.; IMF, Global Financial Stability report 2009, 
Chapter 3, pp. 18ff.
53 For an introduction into the discussion and further references, see L. 
PAPADEMOS, Monetary Policy and the ‘Great Crisis’ – Lessons and Challenges, Speech 
at the 37th Economics Conference Beyond the Crisis – Economic Policy in a New 
Macroeconomic Environment, Vienna 14 May 2009, Available at http://www.ecb.
int/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090514.en.html, part IV.
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budget deficits and debt levels, inflation preferences, trade structures 
etc.). We therefore view exchange rate interventions and currency pegs 
critically – in particular if countries with high current account surpluses 
like China keep their currencies at low levels, thus perpetuating inter-
national imbalances and creating protectionist pressures in importing 
countries. Letting major currencies float freely is a market-oriented 
approach and can help the adjustment process. Along the way, more 
floating currencies would also expand the spectrum of available reserve 
currencies, thus reducing pressure towards the use of the US Dollar as 
a reserve asset or towards the enhanced use of the IMF Special Drawing 
Right (SDR), as has been proposed. Other measures eyeing the ex-
change rate (such as the Brazilian tax on certain foreign investment or 
the Taiwanese ban for foreigners to invest in Taiwanese time deposits) 
should be phased-out, too.
7.5. Other policy options
The policy options discussed in Sections 7.1 through 7.4 address the 
same areas in which interventionism has taken place since the outbreak 
of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In addition, there are a few further 
areas in which the crisis has either shown, or confirmed, the need for 
action.
Improving banking and bankruptcy regulation: One major area in which 
improved regulation is required, is the financial sector. As the BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (BIS) holds in its annual report 2009, banks 
«[...] must adjust by becoming smaller, simpler, and safer». Often, how-
ever, the emergency action by governments has led to the opposite, 
adding to systemic risk54. Against this background, improved banking 
regulation is a must with a view to prevent future crises and their huge 
economic and social costs. Options include simpler measures of lever-
54 See BIS, 79 th Annual Report, p. 119. With regard to the rescue packages, the BIS 
holds that «[...] even where they have been essential, the government rescue pack-
ages implemented so far appear to be hindering rather than aiding this needed 
adjustment. By helping banks obtain debt financing and capital, rescue packages 
allow managers to avoid the hard choices needed to reduce both the size of their 
balance sheets (lowering leverage) and the amount of risk that they take (shifting the 
composition of the assets they hold). And by aiding the sale of distressed banks to 
other banks, as has been typical of many past crisis responses, government actions 
are creating financial institutions so big and complex that even their own manage-
ment may not understand their risk exposures. Despite the nearly universal concern 
over the mere existence of institutions that are too big to fail, short-run government 
actions are increasing financial sector concentration and adding to systemic risk».
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age, higher capital requirements, and better risk assessment. In addition, 
bankruptcy rules need to be reviewed and, if necessary, re-designed with 
a view to preventing unnecessary damage from the failure of systemi-
cally relevant financial sector firms. Moreover, the distorting effect of 
the implicit state guarantee on financial institutions with systemic rel-
evance (and the moral hazard that emerges in such situations) must be 
addressed. Or as the BIS (2009, p. 120) puts it: «[...] a financial firm that 
is too big or too interconnected to fail must be too big to exist».
Maintaining or restoring labour market and wage flexibility: An area, 
which at first sight has no direct relationship to the crisis and to the 
policy interventions which we have discussed, is the regulation of la-
bour markets. However, the links are stronger than one might expect: 
Although the reasons for the stickiness of wages are subject to contro-
versial debate in academic and policy-oriented literature, institutional 
rules and the flexibility of the labour market appear to play a crucial 
role. A highly regulated labour market with (high) minimum wages, 
compulsory industry-wide collective agreements, and high dismissal 
protection can react less flexibly to a fall in demand. As a consequence, 
the burden shifts towards trade protectionism and fiscal as well as mon-
etary expansion. An economy with a labour market that is capable of 
adjusting to economic shocks and reduced demand without creating 
mass unemployment is less dependent on such interventions. In order 
to garner sufficient political support, liberal labour markets need to be 
bolstered by a reliable social security system. The latter, in turn, should 
be able to adjust to changes in the overall economic environment and it 
should not provide adverse incentives.
Ensuring sustainability in the use of the environment and of natural resourc-
es: An apparently unrelated issue is the question of the right governance 
of the environment and of resources as key production factors in the 
economy. However, there is a strong link since financial and economic 
stability require that the outstanding claims and obligations (e.g. money, 
bonds, other financial assets) be covered by production capacities in the 
real economy. The latter, in turn, require a safe supply of raw materials 
(e.g. metals, energy) and an ecological environment allowing for produc-
tion (e.g fertile soil, clean water and air, and benign climatic conditions) 
as essential production factors. As these production factors often have 
the character of public goods, they tend to be overused or squandered 
in the absence of adequately defined property rights and regulations for 
their use. The rapid industrialisation of emerging markets has put ad-
ditional strain on the world’s resources, as has also become manifest in 
China’s hunt for raw materials around the globe.
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By contrast to the interventionist approach to trade, fiscal and 
monetary policies, governments are only reluctantly addressing the sus-
tainability issue, although the definition and the protection of property 
rights are a government’s core business. The unsuccessful Copenhagen 
conference on climate change in late 2009 is an example in case of the 
continued tragedy of the global commons. Uncontrolled emissions of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, the 
contamination of oceans, other waters, and the air, as well as the loss 
of biodiversity create enormous costs and liabilities towards future 
generations which are nowhere accounted for and which are not being 
internalised in production costs. The same holds for the ease and the 
speed at which non-renewable resources – minerals, metals, and fos-
sile fuels – are being extracted, consumed, and depleted. This speed 
stands in stark contrast to the arguably (lower) technological pace by 
which these resources can be substituted. The management of natural 
resources often occurs with a view to short-term profits, sometimes by 
hardly legitimate elites in poor countries and with little benefit to the lo-
cal populations. The currently poor resource and environment policies 
therefore act as huge subsidies for certain economic activities and thus 
create considerable distortions in consumption, production and factor 
allocation. These are further exacerbated by the fiscal and monetary 
stimulus measures.
Reforms that would seriously address the sustainability issue are 
a political hard sell in short-sighted electoral cycles since they would 
create adjustment costs and weigh on the comfortable life styles in pre-
sent-day industrialised societies. However, such reforms will ultimately 
be necessary if the world economy is to be brought on a sustainable, 
stability-oriented path.
8. Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the economic interventions by governments 
and central banks in response to the 2008-2009 financial and economic 
crisis.
In the area of trade policy, we have found that protectionism has 
increased substantially, with governments targeting in particular the 
products of declining industries and financial services. Although 
trade-restricting measures dominate the policy agenda, spiralling pro-
tectionism as in the 1930s has so far been avoided.
126 THOMAS A. ZIMMERMANN
In investment policy, the crisis has not led to a general increase of 
protectionist pressures for the time being. The outbreak of the financial 
crisis and the subsequent need to attract FDI inflows for the recapitali-
zation of distressed financial institutions have even led to a softening of 
the stance towards SWFs in host countries. Nevertheless, the long-term 
trend towards liberalisation has recently been complemented by a trend 
towards more regulation – globally, and particularly in Latin America.
The main areas of economic interventionism, however, have been fis-
cal policy and monetary policy. On the fiscal side, important stimulus 
programs and emergency actions to stabilise the financial system have 
been implemented, involving governments in the credit business and 
in the management or ownership of firms, thus creating potential for 
state failures, moral hazard, political mismanagement, the emergence of 
vested interests and protectionist actions. At the macroeconomic level, 
these measures are associated with enormous costs to public finances 
and sometimes with the transfer of risky assets from the private to the 
public hand.
Monetary policy has been the other key element in economic inter-
ventionism. Central Banks have made full use of their arsenal of policy 
instruments: massive interest rate cuts, quantitative easing, and various 
other measures (including interventions on foreign exchange markets). 
Given their cumulative size, these interventions hold a substantial 
potential for distortions and protectionism. They also raise important 
questions about negative side effects, including the erosion of govern-
ment finances and the threat of future inflation. These concerns can be 
addressed, but they require constant monitoring of the affected policy 
areas and decisive action towards achieving a timely exit.
